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This paper re-examines the impact that paying interest on reserves has on price level indeterminacy,
volatility, and economic well-being. Unlike the previous literature, this model includes an after-tax
deﬁc i tt h a tm u s tb eﬁnanced by assets (bonds and reserves) whose returns are linked. I show
the number of steady state equilibria is equal to, or greater than, the number arising in the no-
interest economy. Consequently, the level of indeterminacy is equal to, or greater than, in the
no-interest economy. When the level of indeterminacy is the same, then economic volatility is
reduced by paying interest. However, greater indeterminacy in the interest economy, results in
greater volatility. Paying interest on reserves can enhance welfare and, under certain conditions,
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic may also obtain.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D6, E3, E51I n t r o d u c t i o n
The issue of paying interest on reserves was introduced by Milton Friedman almost ﬁfty years ago
in A Program for Monetary Stability. Friedman’s original motivation was to make the 100% reserve
requirement of the “Chicago Plan” more palatable to a banking system subject to only a fractional
reserve system. The goal of the Chicago Plan and the proposal to pay interest on reserves was to
establish greater price level stability and to reduce excessive price level ﬂuctuations.1
In the subsequent decades, there has been considerable research regarding the implications
of paying interest on reserves.2 Three studies, in particular Sargent and Wallace (1985), Smith
(1991), and Freeman and Haslag (1996), have examined in detail whether Friedman’s proposal
would bring about the desired reductions in price level indeterminacy and volatility, as well as the
welfare implications of switching from a system of not paying interest on reserves to one which
did.3 However, these works suﬀered from two speciﬁc limitations. First, they did not equate the
interest paid on reserves to returns on assets of similar risk and duration. Second, they assumed
that either the government ran a balanced budget or had a surplus.
By assuming the budget was not in deﬁcit, these works side-stepped two important issues: (1)
the impact that deﬁcit ﬁnancing has on the means for ﬁnancing interest payments and (2) the
complications that arise from simultaneously attempting to ﬁnance a deﬁcit and set the real return
on reserves. One of the key results of this previous literature was that how interest payments were
ﬁnanced was crucial to the likelihood of indeterminacy and volatility arising. However, if the sum
1The Federal Reserve currently does not have the authority to pay interest on reserves. However, in recent years
Congress has introduced legislation which would allow interest payments, and this legislation has the support of the
Federal Reserve, see Kohn (2004) and Meyer (2001). The Fed’s objective is twofold: (1) to avoid potential volatility
in the federal funds market and (2) to eliminate resources wasted due to reserve avoidance measures (for example,
sweep accounts). Anderson and Rasche (2001) conclude that paying interest is unlikely to impact the use of sweep
accounts as interest payments on reserves are unlikely to be suﬃciently high to entice banks to hold greater reserves.
Consequently, the primary beneﬁt of paying interest would be to reduce volatility — the focus of this paper.
2The focus of these studies fall broadly into three categories: the use of interest payments on reserves strictly as
a policy tool (see for example Woodford (2003), Goodfriend (2002), Hall (2002), and Goodhart (2000)), the role of
paying interest on reserves on payment services policies (see for example Toma (1999) and Lacker (1997)), and the
impact of interest payments on welfare, price level determinacy, and economic stability (see for example Sargent and
Wallace (1985), Smith (1991), and Freeman and Haslag (1996)).
3Sargent and Wallace (1985) highlighted two key facts. First, paying interest on reserves, combined with a 100%
reserve requirement, would not necessarily lead to a deterministic price level and less ﬂuctuations. Second, the
method of ﬁnancing interest payments could lead to real diﬀerences in economic outcomes. Smith (1991) showed that
if the rate of return on reserves were tied to productive investment technologies, then the indeterminacies described
in Sargent and Wallace (1985) disappear. However, interest ﬁnanced via taxes resulted in a series of oscillating
equilibria, and thus, may lead to greater economic ﬂuctuations. In addition, Smith (1991) showed that there was no
welfare justiﬁcation for paying interest on reserves. Finally, Freeman and Haslag (1996) explored means by which
paying interest on reserves could be Pareto optimal. They showed that if an appropriate, accommodative open market
operation was undertaken, then the initial old generation would be indiﬀerent, while all future generations would be
better-oﬀ. See Guzman (2004) for a more in-depth review of these three papers.
1of government expenditures and interest payments (on bonds and reserves) exceeds tax revenue,
then the issue of how interest payments on reserves are ﬁnanced (via taxes or earnings on assets) is
no longer relevant. Instead, the appropriate concern is whether the government can simultaneously
ﬁnance the deﬁcit (by issuing bonds or printing money), link the return on reserves to other assets
(such as bonds), and maintain suﬃcient returns on bonds and reserves such that both assets are
d e s i r e db yc o n s u m e r s .
The objective of this paper is to re-examine, in the presence of an after-tax deﬁcit, the impact of
switching from a system where reserves earn no interest to one where they do. This is accomplished
in the context of a two period overlapping generations model with multiple assets and an after-tax
government deﬁc i tt h a tm u s tb eﬁnanced by a combination of debt and seigniorage income. The
primary goal is to compare the level of economic indeterminacy, economic volatility, and welfare
gains in an economy where interest is paid on reserves to one where reserves earn no interest.
More speciﬁcally, this paper addresses the following three questions. First, in the presence
of a government deﬁcit and a return on storage that dominates all other rates of return, does
paying interest on reserves reduce potential indeterminacy of equilibria? Second, under the same
conditions does the amount of economic volatility increase or decrease? Third, are there any welfare
justiﬁcations for switching to a system where reserves earn interest? In addition, given the presence
of both debt and seigniorage in ﬁnancing the deﬁcit, the issue of unpleasant monetarist arithmetic
is explored?
The key ﬁndings of this paper can be summarized as follows. When there exists an after-tax
government deﬁcit, and reserves are paid a rate of return equal to that of bonds (and less than
the return on storage), the number of steady state equilibria (in terms of real money balances)
are equal to, or greater than, the number that arise when no interest is paid on reserves. Thus,
the level of economic indeterminacy is equal to, or greater than, in an economy without interest
payments. This runs counter to what Friedman had envisioned and the results of Smith (1991). In
addition, the steady state equilibrium associated with the highest level of real money balances is
a source, while the steady state associated with the lowest level of balances is a sink. Any other
steady states will alternate between being sinks and sources. For those steady states which are
sinks, convergence is monotonic.
Second, when the number of steady state equilibria are the same in the interest and no-interest
economies (i.e., the level of indeterminacy is the same), then economic volatility is reduced with
the introduction of interest payments. However, when greater indeterminacy exists in the interest
2economy, there also exists greater volatility. Third, when multiple (generically two) steady state
equilibria exist in both economies, then the equilibrium associated with low real money balances in
the interest economy is welfare improving compared to the no-interest economy. In addition, if the
economy is converging to the low real money balances steady state in the no-interest economy, then
after switching to an interest paying regime, the economy will transition to the low real balances
steady state in the interest economy. When at the unstable steady state in the no-interest economy,
if the government begins to pay interest then a new equilibrium can be reached only if there is an
accompanying expansionary open market operation. Finally, under a narrow set of conditions,
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic may arise.
The key to the intuition behind these results is understanding the constraints that paying
interest places on the means for ﬁnancing the deﬁcit.4 In the no-interest economy, the government
can price discriminate and choose whether to use more expensive (bonds) or less expensive (money)
means to ﬁnance its deﬁcit. In addition, it can decide whether to use a large seigniorage tax base
(and small tax rate) or conversely a large seigniorage tax rate (and small tax base). Its decision
regarding which instruments and what size tax rates to use are independent, to the extent that in
the end, the deﬁcit must be ﬁnanced.
When the return on reserves is linked to the return on bonds, the government’s ability to price
discriminate in its ﬁnancing options is limited. Thus, ﬁnancing the deﬁcit via seigniorage and bonds
is more expensive relative to the no-interest economy. In addition, with the return on money linked
to bonds, the government’s ability to exercise a trade-oﬀ between the tax rate and the tax base is
curtailed. As a result, paying interest on reserves shrinks the set of real money balances that is
consistent with ﬁnancing the ﬁxed deﬁcit.
When there exist multiple steady state equilibria in both the interest and no-interest economies,
then the range of real money balances (the seigniorage tax base) will be smaller in the interest econ-
omy because the link between the returns on bonds and money reduces the government’s options.
T h i sr e s u l t si nl e s sv o l a t i l i t yi nt h ei n t e r e s te c onomy. However, because the government can still
choose the initial level of real money balances (from an inﬁnite set of possibilities), indeterminacy
is unaﬀected.
4It is important to point out that the indeterminacy and volatility are not the result of any volatility present in
the economic fundamentals (i.e. there are no stochastic aspects to this model). In this respect, the model presented
in this paper diﬀers from the ideas explored by Friedman in A Program for Monetary Stability. One of the issues with
which Friedman was concerned was the existence of real world stochastic processes and their impact on equilibrium
outcomes. In the end however, Friedman was focused on the volatility and indeterminacy of outcomes (prices, output,
etc.). It is in this vein (outcomes) that this paper is consistent with Friedman’s concerns regarding indeterminacy
and volatility (despite a diﬀerence in the sources of this volatility).
3The existence of multiple steady state equilibria is contingent on the deﬁcit ﬁnancing options
(the quantity of bonds and reserves) being consistent with consumers wanting to hold all assets.
Because the no-interest economy faces fewer constraints on ﬁnancing its deﬁcit, extreme values
for tax bases and rates (for example, a very small seigniorage tax base and a very high tax rate,
i.e. high inﬂation), are more likely to be consistent with ﬁnancing its deﬁcit. However, while
ﬁnancing the deﬁcit may be possible, the associated tax base and tax rate may not be consistent
with individuals wanting to hold all assets (i.e. if inﬂation is too high, individuals will not want to
hold money). In this case, the low real money balances steady state in the no-interest economy is
obviously not consistent with equilibrium. While there might be two candidate steady state levels
of real money balances, only the larger one is consistent with ﬁnancing the deﬁcit without violating
the requirement that all assets earn a non-negative return. Thus, under certain parameter settings,
the interest economy will have two steady state equilibria while the no-interest economy only one.
Obviously, in this case, both the level of indeterminacy and volatility will be greater on the interest
bearing economy.
Finally, it is assumed that both economies are Samuelson-case economies, where savings (and
hence consumption) are strictly increasing in the level of real money balances. Since the set of
real balances consistent with equilibrium is larger in the no-interest economy, the steady state
equilibrium values of real balances are higher at the high real balances steady state and lower at
the low real balances steady state than those of the corresponding interest economy. Thus, when
comparing the low real money balance steady states and dynamic equilibria converging to them,
paying interest will be welfare improving.
The basic economic model used in this paper is a variation of Bhattacharya et al. (1998) and
simply augments it with interest payments on reserves. The structure of the economy is as follows.
The economy consists of an inﬁnite sequence of two-period lived, overlapping generations, where
individuals across generations are identical in all dimensions. Consumers are endowed each period
with a given amount of a consumption good which they either consume or invest. Individuals
may invest their saving in any of three diﬀerent assets. There is a storage technology, which pays
the highest rate of return, government bonds, and money, whose return is dominated by all other
assets. It is assumed that individuals cannot invest directly in the storage technology and that all
investment in storage must be intermediated and is subject to a reserve requirement. Required
reserves pay a rate of return equal to that of government securities. Thus, individuals save by
purchasing bonds and depositing their savings with intermediaries.
4In addition, there exists a government which must ﬁnance a constant per capita after-tax deﬁcit
while also paying interest on bonds and reserves. This deﬁcit and interest payments are funded
by some combination of money creation and new debt oﬀerings. Finally, it is assumed that the
government conducts policy by choosing (once and for all in the ﬁrst period) a ratio of bonds to
currency. Variations in this ratio can be thought of as permanent open market operations.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy, while
Section 3 states conditions necessary for steady state equilibrium to exist and examines the dynamic
properties of the model. The propensity for unpleasant monetarist arithmetic to arise is also
discussed in this section. Comparisons of steady state equilibria and the dynamic paths converging
to them, of price level determinacy and volatility, and of economic welfare between the interest and
no-interest economies are the topics of Section 4. Section 5 concludes and all proofs can be found
in the Appendices.
2 The Model
The economy consists of an inﬁnite sequence of two-period lived, overlapping generations, along
with an initial old generation. Time is discrete and indexed by t =1 ,2,... At every date t an e w
generation, comprised of N identical members, is born. There exists a government that has a
constant per capita real expenditure level of g>0 in each period. The government levies no direct
taxes, and so it must ﬁnance its deﬁcit by issuing money and bonds.5 Let Mt denote the per capita
stock of money outstanding at the end of period t,a n dBt denote the outstanding per capita supply
of bonds (both in nominal terms). All bonds are of one-period maturity, and are default free.
2.1 Consumers
Individuals are endowed with some of a single, non-produced good, which can either be consumed
or stored. The endowment of a representative individual is given by ω1 > 0 when young and by
ω2 ≥ 0 when old. In addition, members of the initial old are each endowed with ω0 ≥ 0 units
of consumption, and with M0 > 0 units of ﬁat currency. Consumption of a representative agent
born at t is denoted by ct
t when young and ct
t+1 when old. All individuals have the identical utility
5Alternatively, one could imagine that the government levies some (ﬁxed) lump-sum taxes. Then one would
interpret the endowments received by individuals, ω1and ω2, as after-tax endowments, and g as the after-tax deﬁcit.
In Freeman and Haslag (1996), Smith (1991), and Sargent and Wallace (1985), how interest payments were ﬁnanced
was important to the outcome. However, in this model a positive after-tax per capita deﬁc i ti m p l i e st h a tt h eﬁnancing







,w h e r eU is assumed to be strictly increasing in each argument, to be twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, and to be strictly quasi-concave. The initial old value only old age
consumption and desire as much of it as possible.
Young individuals can store their endowment, sell it to old individuals in exchange for money,
or sell it to the government in exchange for either money or bonds. All individuals are assumed to
have access to a non-stochastic, constant returns to scale technology for storing their endowment.
In particular, one unit stored at date t returns R>1 units of consumption at date t +1 .6 Let kt
denote the amount that an individual chooses to store at date t. In addition, let pt denote the time
t price level, let zt denote the holdings of real balances by a young individual at t,a n dl e tbt denote
real bond holdings by a representative young agent at t. It is assumed that storage is subject to a
reserve requirement,
zt ≥ λkt, (1)
and that the government pays a gross rate of return xt+1 in period t +1on the nominal balances
w h i c hw e r eo b t a i n e di np e r i o dt. In addition to this reserve requirement, each young individual
faces the following budget constraints at t:
ct
t + zt + kt + bt ≤ ω1 (2)
ct






where ρt+1 is the gross real rate of return on government bonds between t and t +1 .












holds, then the reserve requirement is binding, and equation (1) holds as an equality.7 This situation
6I fp o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hw e r ea l l o w e d ,t h e nt h ec o n d i t i o nt h a tR exceeds one plus the rate of population growth
would need to be imposed.
7The assumption that storage has a higher return, R, than that found on other assets is exogenous to the model.
The return to storage in this model is analogous to the average long-run rate of return on capital in the real world.
The assumptions made regarding R are motivated by, and consistent with, what is observed in the real world —
namely returns to capital dominate the returns to government bonds which dominate the return to money.
6is focused on throughout, in which case one can transform the young individuals’ problem as follows.
Let dt ≡ kt + zt =( 1+λ)kt denote storage plus reserves, which will be referred to as “deposits.”
In addition, let φ ≡ 1
1+λ,w h e r eφ denotes the fraction of deposits held in the form of storage,
and 1 − φ can be thought of as the fraction of deposits required to be held as reserves. With this









t + dt + bt ≤ ω1 (5)
ct
t+1 ≤ ω2 +
∙





dt + ρt+1bt (6)
Obviously, if bonds and deposits are both to be held,





; t ≥ 1 (7)
must hold. The right hand side of equation (7) is simply the weighted return on a portfolio consisting
of storage and currency, with 1 − φ being the portfolio weight attached to currency. Equation (7)
then requires that the return on government bonds equal the appropriately weighted return on
storage and currency, which is – in eﬀect – the rate of return on deposits. Finally, in keeping
with Friedman’s original idea that the rate of return on reserves be equal to the short-term yield
on government securities, it is assumed that xt+1 = ρt+1. Thus, equation (7) can be rewritten as
ρt+1 =
φR




´ ; t ≥ 1. (8)
When equation (8) holds, the problem confronting young individuals can be even further simpli-
ﬁed. Let St denote total savings by a young individual at t : i.e., St ≡ dt +bt. Then this individual
c a nb ev i e w e da sc h o o s i n gSt to maximize U
£









ω1 − St,ω2 + ρt+1St
¤
, (9)
then the function S summarizes an individuals’s optimal savings behavior. The following conditions
on S are assumed to hold throughout the remainder of the paper.
7Assumption 1 For all dates t ≥ 1, the function S satisﬁes
S [min{φR,1}] ≥ 0. (A.1)
Assumption 2 For all dates t ≥ 1, the function S satisﬁes
S0(ρ) > 0, ∀ρ > 0. (A.2)
Assumption (A.1) implies that S(1) ≥ 0 holds, rendering this a “Samuelson case” economy, and
(A.2) asserts that savings are increasing in the rate of return, thereby ruling out “large” income
eﬀects.8 Finally, Assumption (A.1) implies that φ ≥ S−1(0)/R must be satisﬁed; in eﬀect this
imposes an upper bound on the level of the reserve requirement. When this bound is in eﬀect,
individuals are willing to save non-negative amount s ,r e g a r d l e s so ft h er a t eof return on reserves.
2.1.1 Remarks
With respect to how reserve requirements are modeled, equation (1) is meant to be interpreted
as a conventional reserve requirement. Consistent with Bhattacharya et al. (1998), Espinosa-Vega
and Russell (1998), and Wallace (1984), individuals can be thought of as not being allowed to
store their own goods and hence require the services of an intermediary. Consumers decide what
fraction of their savings to invest in bonds and what fraction to deposit in the bank, so that they
can obtain the highest return — the return from the storage technology. However, intermediaries
are required to hold a fraction of deposits – equal to (1 − φ) – in the form of cash reserves.
Thus, all deposits are split between the storage technology and cash. If there is free entry into
intermediation, intermediaries will earn zero proﬁts and hold a portfolio maximizing the utility of a
representative depositor. In this case, equations (1)-(3) simply represent the consolidated balance
sheets of banks and individuals.9,10
The interpretation of the interest rate paid on reserves, xt+1 also deserves further attention.
8See Gale (1973).
9I nt h i sm o d e l ,t h er e s e r v er e q u i r e m e n ti sam e a n sf o re n s u r i n gt h a ta s s e t sw i t hd o m i n a t e dr e t u r n s( s u c ha sm o n e y )
are held in equilibrium. In other words, it is the governments way to ensure that it has a low cost option for ﬁnancing
its deﬁcit. This has implications for how the government ﬁnances its deﬁcit (which are discussed later in the paper).
Understanding the impact of reserve requirements on government ﬁnancing has been studied extensively before, for
example see Dwyer and Saving (1986) for a steady state model that examines the role of reserve requirements in a
model with money and deposits.
10It should also be noted that it has been assumed that bond-holders do not face a reserve requirement. See
comments throughout Bhattacharya et al. (1998) about the impact on the basic model when interest is not paid on
reserves.
8While Friedman (1960) does not spend a great deal of time discussing how to set the interest rate
on reserves, he does brieﬂy suggest that a viable option would be to set the rate equal to the average
yield on short-term government bonds from the previous few quarters.11 This would correspond
to setting xt+1 = ρt, as opposed to xt+1 = ρt+1 as done in this model. However, the key issue is
linking the return on money to bonds, not whether the relationship is forward or backward looking.
When interest is not paid on reserves, the government can price discriminate in its ﬁnancing options
(bonds being a more expensive option than money). However, when interest is paid and the returns
on money and bonds are linked, then the government’s ability to price discriminate is eliminated
(or reduced). Consequently, when comparing the two economies what matters most is whether the
ability to price discriminate is better — in the sense that it reduces indeterminacy and volatility in
the economy.
2.1.2 The Government
T h eg o v e r n m e n tm u s tﬁnance a real per capita deﬁcit of g each period through the issue of money




+ bt − ρtbt−1 −
xtMt−1
pt
; ∀t ≥ 1 (10)
Equation (10) asserts that the real value of money created in period t, (Mt − Mt−1)/pt,p l u st h e
real value of the bonds sold at that date, bt, must equal the real value of the government budget
deﬁcit, g, plus the interest obligations on outstanding government debt, ρtbt−1 and the interest
obligations associated with reserves, xtMt−1 /pt. It is assume that the government conducts policy




; t ≥ 1 (11)
of bonds to currency. Variations in μ can be thought of as permanent open market operations.12
In addition, the government sets the reserve requirement 1−φ. The initial level of the money stock
must satisfy M0 > 0 and B0 =0is assumed to be given as initial conditions.
11See Friedman (1961, chapter 3, p75) for the lone paragraph devoted to the appropriate choice of the rate of return
to be paid on reserve holdings.
12Note that this deﬁnition of an open market operation diﬀers from that in Freeman and Haslag (1996). Here it
represents a shift in the composition of deﬁcit ﬁnancing instruments. In Freeman and Haslag (1996) it amounted to
a purchase of an asset which was used to reduce the funds the bank needed to acquire to pay interest on reserves.
9Substituting equations (7), (11), and zt ≡ Mt /pt = λkt =( 1 − φ)dt in equation (10), it is
possible to rewrite the government budget constraint as13

















; t ≥ 2. (12)
Equation (12) can be interpreted as the government must issue enough liabilities at t, zt + bt =
(1 + μ)zt,t oﬁnance its current deﬁcit plus the implied interest obligation on its inherited liabilities.
3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium requires that consumers maximize their utility and the government budget constraint
holds. The ﬁrst condition requires that the quantity of savings demanded must equal the quantity
supplied. Given the deﬁnition of zt,w h e r ezt ≡ Mt /pt is the real value of the per capita money





must hold in equilibrium. In addition, the supply of government
















; t ≥ 1. (13)







, and substituting the result into
equation (12) yields the equilibrium law of motion for per capita real balances:












































gives the equilibrium rate of return on government bonds, while for
















13The initial, t =1 , government budget constraint is (1+μ)z1 = g+(1+x1)M0/p1. Once z1 and x1 are determined,
then this government budget constraint gives us the initial price level.
10describes the gross rate of return on real balances (the inverse of the gross rate of inﬂation.) It
is straightforward to verify that the return on savings, ρt+1, and the return on money, pt /pt+1 ,
are both increasing functions of the level of real money balances. Consequently, an increase in the
equilibrium level of real money holdings will result in an increase in utility for the consumer.
There are, of course, a number of conditions that an equilibrium sequence {zt} must satisfy.
First, it must satisfy (14) at each date. Second, zt ≥ 0 for all dates t ≥ 1 must also hold. Third,
given the method of derivation, the reserve requirement must be binding at each date. And, ﬁnally,
equation (15) must yield a non-negative gross return on real balances. These last two requirements









<R ; t ≥ 1 (16)
Equations (14), (16), and zt ≥ 0 constitute the equilibrium conditions.
3.1 Steady State Equilibria
Before examining the dynamic properties of this model, it will be useful to establish those conditions
under which steady state equilibria exist. Setting zt−1 = zt = z in equation (14) and rearranging






















Deﬁne H (z,μ,φ,R) by




















The function H (z,μ,φ,R) describes how much revenue, net of interest obligations, the government
can raise in a steady state equilibrium if the per capita level of real balances is z, the bond-money
ratio is μ, and the reserve requirement is 1 − φ. In such an equilibrium, of course, the quantity of
revenue raised must equal the government budget deﬁcit g. However, in order for z to constitute a
steady state equilibrium level of real balances, z must satisfy not only equation (17), but equation
(16) as well.
To ascertain the conditions under which steady state equilibria exist, as well as their number,
it will be useful to know more about the function H (z,μ,φ,R). Its properties are stated in the
following lemma.
11Lemma 1 (a) H (z,μ,φ,R)=0holds iﬀ z =0or








































holds for all (μ,φ,R).
Lemma 1 is proved in Appendix A. For simplicity of exposition the following assumption is made.
Assumption 3 For all values of μ, φ,Rand 0 ≤ z ≤ z†,
H11 (z,μ,φ,R) < 0. (A.3)
Thus, H (z,μ,φ,R) is a concave function of z.
Under Assumptions (A.1)-(A.3), equation (18) has the conﬁguration depicted in Figure 1. Any
values of z satisfying equation (18) are candidate steady state equilibria. As shown in the ﬁgure,
if there are any such candidates, there will generically be exactly two.14 Let z− denote the steady
state with lower real balance holdings and z+ the steady state with higher holdings. As is evident
from Figure 1 the lower level of real balance holdings occurs on the “bad” side of the Laﬀer curve
and the higher level on the “good” side: i.e., H1 (z−,μ,φ,R) > 0 >H 1 (z+,μ,φ,R) must hold.












The following result, and assumption on which it is based, will be useful in ascertaining when the
right-hand side of equation (16) is binding. The lemma is proved in Appendix B.
Assumption 4 Let μ, φ,Rbe such that
1 ≥ μ(φR − 1) (A.4)
14If Assumption (A.3) is relaxed, there can be more than two candidate steady states. In general, these equilibria
will occur in pairs.
12holds.15











For the remainder of the paper Assumption (A.4) is assumed to hold. Consequently, only the left-
hand constraint in equation (16) can bind on the determination of a steady state equilibrium. There
are three possibilities regarding whether z− and z+ constitute legitimate steady state equilibria.





≤ z−, then there are two genuine steady
state equilibria.





≤ z+, then only z+ constitutes a
legitimate steady state equilibrium. Thus, there exists a unique steady state equilibrium.





, then no steady state equilibria exist.
Obviously this last case is not of particular interest, and thus the remainder of the paper focuses
on Cases 1 and 2, which are represented by Figure 1. An examination of these ﬁgures indicates
that Case 1 is most likely to obtain for large values of g (given μ and φ) ,w h i l eC a s e2must obtain
for suﬃciently small values of g (again, for given choices of μ and φ). Thus, for suﬃciently small
but positive values of g (where small means relative to μ and φ), there will exist a unique steady
state equilibrium. This is true even though the function H (z,μ,φ,R) exhibits all of the standard
properties that give rise to a “Laﬀer curve” phenomenon. The possibility that there is a unique
steady state equilibrium, even in the presence of a Laﬀer curve, is a consequence of the fact that not
all ﬁnancing options consistent with supporting a given deﬁcit, are also consistent with individuals
wanting to hold all assets. In general, ﬁnancing a given deﬁcit can be achieved either by a small
seigniorage tax base and high inﬂation or a large tax base and low inﬂation. When g is suﬃciently
small, it is not possible to ﬁnance the deﬁcit with a small monetary base, maintain the link between
the return on bonds and reserves, and have a positive return to money (i.e. equation (15) results in
15Assumption (A.4) holds for all values of μ if φR ≤ 1. For an economy with a reserve requirement of 10 percent
(φ =0 .9), this condition will be satisﬁed if there is no asset with a safe, real rate of return in excess of 11.11 percent,
which certainly seems empirically plausible. Of course if φR>1 holds, then Assumption (A.4) places an upper
bound on μ. In the third quarter of 2004, the outstanding gross public debt of the U.S. was $7.38 trillion, while the
monetary base was about $749 billion. Thus, for the U.S., μ ≈ 9.85. In this case, Assumption (A.4) would hold so
long as φR<1.102.
13a negative return to money). The key to this result is the fact that linking the return on reserves to
the return on money restricts how the government can ﬁnance its deﬁcit because its two options,
using bonds and money, are not independent of each other anymore.
Finally, before investigating the dynamic properties of this economy, it will be useful to examine
the impact of open market operations on steady state equilibrium values as well as to determine
whether unpleasant monetarist arithmetic obtains.
3.2 Comparative Statics
Of particular interest is how changes in the bond-money ratio, μ,a ﬀect the steady state equilibrium
level(s) of real balances, and the rate of inﬂation. An increase in μ corresponds to a (permanently)
higher bond-money ratio, and hence to a contractionary open market operation, as conventionally
deﬁned.





= −H2 (z,μ,φ.R). (20)
The following lemma (which is proved in Appendix C) is now established.
Lemma 3 Suppose that φR/[1+φ(1 − R)] >S −1 ¡
z†¢
holds, then H2 (z+,μ,φ,R) < 0 and
∂z+ /∂μ < 0.
Lemma 3 asserts that under the condition that the return on bonds not be too large relative to
the return on storage (for a given reserve requirement), a contractionary open market operation
necessarily reduces z+.16 Finally, what one would ultimately like to know is the eﬀect of a change
in μ on the steady state rate of return on real balances or, in other words, on the inverse inﬂation
rate pt /pt+1 . Appendix D establishes the following proposition.















If φR/[1+φ(1 − R)] >S −1 ¡
z†¢
holds, as in Lemma 3, then ∂ (pt /pt+1)/∂μ < 0 whenever
H1 (z,μ,φ,R) < 0. In addition, when H1 (z,μ,φ,R) > 0, then ∂ (pt /pt+1)/∂μ > 0.
16B a s e do nL e m m a3n o t h i n gd e ﬁnitive can be said as to what happens to z
− : it may rise or fall. In addition,




, when H1 (z,μ,φ,R) < 0 it will be the case that
H2 (z,μ,φ,R) < 0.
14Proposition 1 states the familiar result about the “Laﬀer curve” and “unpleasant monetarist arith-
metic.” Under the conditions necessary for Lemma 3 to hold, ∂ (pt /pt+1)/∂μ increases on the
upward sloping portion of H (z,μ,φ,R), while decreasing on the downward sloping portion. Thus,
a contractionary open market operation raises the steady state rate of inﬂa t i o no nt h e“ g o o d - s i d e ”o f
the Laﬀer curve and lowers inﬂation on the “bad-side.” Consistent with Bhattacharya et al. (1998),
this result does not require that ρ exceed the steady state rate of growth. All that is needed is for
some asset whose real rate of return exceeds the economy’s long-run rate of growth exist (in the
model R>1.) The unpleasant monetarist arithmetic is the result of ρ >x t+1pt /pt+1 holding. In
this case, an increase in the bond-money ratio substitutes a more expensive for a less expensive
ﬁnancing instrument. Consequently, heavier use must be made of the inﬂation tax.17 Finally, it
should also be noted that the set of interest rates, ρ, for which unpleasant monetarist arithmetic
arises is potentially smaller when interest is paid on reserves than when it is not.18 Thus, it is less
likely to occur when the return on real balances is more closely tied to the real return on bonds.
Of course these remarks apply to candidate steady state equilibria [that is, those values of z
satisfying equation (17)]. However, in this environment not all candidate steady state equilibria
necessarily satisfy equation (16), and hence not all values of z satisfying equation (17) constitute
legitimate steady states. There are two possibilities of interest regarding the number of steady
states.





≤ z−, both before and after the change in μ.





≤ z+, both before and after the change
in μ.
In the multiple steady state case, z− and z+ are both legitimate steady state equilibria. In the
alternative case, there is a unique steady state equilibrium, z+. If Lemma 3 holds, then in both of
these cases, unpleasant monetarist arithmetic prevails at the high real money balance equilibrium
and contractionary open market activity will lead to a higher steady state inﬂation rate.
17See Bhattacharya et al. (1998) for a more in-depth explanation of this result and also a discussion of the likelihood
that it applies to the United States.








, then it would be the case that ∂ (pt /pt+1)/∂μ > 0





φR/[1+φ(1 − R)] then the results of Proposition 1 are reversed. This is in contrast to the non-interest bearing
economy where unpleasant monetarist arithmetic is always present at the high real money balance steady state.
153.3 Dynamic Equilibria
Before making a comparison between the interest and no-interest economies, it will be useful to
understand the dynamic properties of the economy . Consistent with the previous analysis, the
dynamic properties of the economy will depend largely on whether Case (1) or (2) prevails. Any po-
tential equilibrium sequences of real money balances, {zt}, must satisfy three conditions: equation
(14), equation (16), and zt ≥ 0 for all t. Equation (14) is a simple, non-linear diﬀerence equation






































An examination of equation (22) yields two general cases regarding the shape of equation (14): as
depicted in Figures 2 and 3.










then dzt /dzt−1 ≥ 0 for all z ≥ 0. Thus, equation (14) deﬁnes an everywhere upward-sloping
function, as depicted in Figure 2.




















































For all z>(<)z then dzt /dzt−1 > (<)0. If z <z − then
dzt
dzt−1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
zt−1=z−
> 0
Thus, equation (14) deﬁnes a u-shaped function, as depicted in Figure 2.
16In both of these cases, which are henceforth referred to as Case A, the equilibrium law of motion
is upward sloping at the low real money balances steady state. In addition, the assumptions made
previously regarding equation (14) imply that this equation is also positively sloped at the high
real money balances steady state, i.e. equation (14) cannot be “backward” bending. The other
possible case is the following.
Case B: Suppose that z >z −, then
dzt
dzt−1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
zt−1=z−
< 0
and equation (14) is u-shaped, as depicted by Figure 3.
These two cases (Case A and B) satisfy two of the three criteria necessary for a sequences of
real money balances, {zt}, to be an equilibrium path. As in the steady state analysis, it must also
be the case that equation (16) holds, i.e. all assets must have a positive rate of return. Thus, for
a sequence, {zt} to be an equilibrium path, it must be the case that every element in the sequence
satisﬁes the constraints imposed by equation (16). The following proposition states conditions
under which equation (16) will be violated.
Proposition 2 Suppose that for some value of zt−1
dzt
dzt−1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
zt−1
< 0.
T h e nt h i sl e v e lo fr e a lm o n e yb a l a n c e s ,zt−1, violates equation (16) and can not be an element in
any equilibrium sequence, {zt}.
The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix E. The implications of this proposition
are that no element of an equilibrium path can lie on the downward sloping portion of equation (14).
Thus, in the Case B economy, z− cannot be a steady state equilibrium and any paths converging
to this point also do not represent genuine equilibrium paths. In fact, in this particular case there
exists a unique equilibrium at the high real money balances steady state, z+.19
19It is important to point out that existence of at most two steady state equilibria is the result of Assumption A.3.
If this assumption is relax, then multiple steady state equilibria may exist. In general there will be an even number
of steady states. If more than two steady states exist, then a Case B economy will not have a unique equilibrium.
In fact, the only diﬀerence between it and Case A economies will be that the potential steady state equilibrium with
lowest level of real money holdings (and paths converging to it) will not be genuine equilibrium paths in a Case B
economy.
17In the Case A economy, the existence and nature of dynamic equilibria paths will depend on
whether the economy is a Case 1 or 2 economy. Each is now consider in turn.





≤ z− holds, and there
exist two genuine steady state equilibria as equation (14) is upward sloping at both steady state















then the resulting sequence of real money balances constitutes an equilibrium path. In this case
the high real money balances steady state is a source while the low real money balances steady
state is a sink. In addition, convergence to the low real money balances steady state is monotonic,
as illustrated in Figure 2. Note that for initial values of real money holdings below the low real
money balances steady state, z0 <z −, i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tz0 is “suﬃciently close” to z− [on
the upward sloping portion of equation (14)] in order for a genuine equilibrium path to exist.





>z − holds, and only z+
constitutes a legitimate steady state equilibrium. The point z− cannot be an equilibrium because
it violates equation (16), and hence this level of real balances can be achieved only if the returns to
holding money are negative. Since z− does not constitute a legitimate equilibrium value, any paths
which converge to this point are also not viable equilibrium paths. Thus, as in the Case B economy,
there exists a unique equilibrium value, the high real money balances steady state equilibrium z+,
as depicted in Figure 4.
4 Comparison to the No-Interest Economy
The objective of this paper is to compare of the results in the interest economy to an economy where
interest is not paid on reserves. The no-interest economy is described in detail in Bhattacharya
et al. (1998), and hence only the results are presented here.
When interest is not paid on reserves, then the consumer’s budget constraints and the govern-
ment’s budget constraint are given by
ct
t + dt + bt ≤ ω1
18ct
t+1 ≤ ω2 +
∙










+ bt − ρtbt−1 ; ∀t ≥ 1,
respectively. Solving for the equilibrium law of motion for per capita real balances yields













which is very similar to equation (14). Equation (23) has the same basic shape(s) as equation
(14), and thus it remains to establish their relative positions. The following proposition states the
relationship between zI
t (zt−1,μ,φ,R) and zNI
t (zt−1,μ,φ,R), the interest and no-interest economies
respectively.
Proposition 3 Let zI
t (zt−1,μ,φ,R) and zNI
t (zt−1,μ,φ,R) deﬁne the equilibrium laws of motion
for the interest and non interest economies respectively (i.e. equation (14) and (23) respectively).
(i) For zt−1 =0 , then zI
t (0,μ,φ,R)=zNI
t (0,μ,φ,R)=g/(1 + μ) .
(ii) For all zt−1 > 0, then zI
t (zt−1,μ,φ,R) >z NI
t (zt−1,μ,φ,R).
(iii) If dzI
t /dzt−1 < 0 then dzNI
t /dzt−1 < 0 and if dzNI
t /dzt−1 ≥ 0 then dzI
t /dzt−1 > 0.
The proof of this proposition follows from a straightforward comparison of zI
t (zt−1,μ,φ,R) and
zNI
t (zt−1,μ,φ,R), their derivatives, and equation (16), and hence the proof is omitted. Figure 5
provides a generalized illustration of the relative positions of zI
t (zt−1,μ,φ,R) and zNI
t (zt−1,μ,φ,R).20
The remainder of this section compares inﬂation, indeterminacy, volatility and welfare in the
interest and no-interest economies. For the purposes of these comparisons, much of the remainder of
the paper is restricted to the case where there exists two steady state equilibria in both economies.
In this situation, it is easy to verify that if the economy is on an equilibrium path that converges
to the low real money balances steady state equilibrium, z− (NI), in the no-interest economy and
if at date t, zt <z + (I), then when the government switches to paying interest on reserves, the
economy will transition to the low real money balances steady state equilibrium z− (I). Conversely,
if at date t, zt >z + (I), then no equilibria exist after switching to interest payments on reserves
20Given the three general possibilities for the shapes of equations (14) and (23) (depicted in Figures 2 and 3), there
are several possible combinations regarding their relative shapes. However, for all possible combinations Proposition
3 must hold. Thus, Figure 5 represents a single possibility of the relative shapes of the equilibrium laws of motion
in the interest and no-interest economies (i.e. both upward sloping). However, the results discussed below generalize
to any combination of equilibrium laws of motion one may draw.
19unless a change in government policy, μ, can cause the equilibrium law of motion, equation (14)
to shift to the right. Thus, Lemma 3 implies that paying interest combined with an expansionary
open market operation can yield no change in the equilibrium level of real balances.21
4.1 Deﬁcits and Inﬂation
As illustrated in Figure 5, for a given bond-money ratio, μ, and a given reserve requirement, φ, the
set of sustainable government deﬁc i t si ss m a l l e rw h e ni n t e r e s ti sp a i do nr e s e r v e s .L e tˆ g be deﬁned
as the government deﬁcit associated with the following condition
dzt (I)
dzt−1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
zt=zt−1=z
=1 .
It is easy to verify that for g>ˆ g, no equilibria exist (i.e. equation (14) never intersects the 45o
line). Thus the range of government deﬁcits consistent with the existence of equilibria is given
by g ∈ [0,ˆ g]. It is obvious from Figure 5 that ˆ g (NI) > ˆ g (I), and thus, the set of sustainable
government deﬁcits is smaller when paying interest on reserves. This is not surprising considering
that the total resources are the same in both economies and that paying interest on reserves results
in fewer available resources to sustain the government deﬁcit.
The inﬂation levels in the two economies can also be compared. In the no-interest economy, the













while for the interest economy it is given by equation (15). The following lemma states suﬃcient
conditions under which the rate of inﬂa t i o ni sg r e a t e r ,t h el o w e rt h el e v e lo fr e a lm o n e yb a l a n c e s .
Lemma 4 Suppose multiple steady state equilibria exist in both economies and let ˆ z be the value







The proof of this lemma follows from Assumption A.2, equation (16) and a comparison of equations
(15) and (24). Lemma 4 states that for a given initial level of real money balances, the equilibrium
21In eﬀect, if an appropriate expansionary monetary policy is undertaken when introducing interest payments on
reserves, then equation (14) (I) in Figure 5 can be pivoted to the right and be identical to equation (23) (NI).
20path converging to the low real money balances steady state will exhibit a lower rate of inﬂation
at every date t in the economy where interest is paid on reserves.
The intuition for this follows from two facts. First, at every date t, zNI
t <z I
t for all paths
converging to the stable steady state. Second, at every date both economies must ﬁnance the same
size after-tax deﬁcit. For a given size deﬁcit, the government can either have a large tax base and
small tax rate or conversely a small tax base and relatively larger tax rate. Because zNI
t <z I
t at
every date t, the seigniorage tax base is always smaller in the no-interest economy. Hence, it must
be the case that there is a larger tax rate (inﬂation) in the no-interest economy since the level of
after-tax deﬁcit is identical in the two economies.
4.2 Indeterminacy and Volatility
One of Friedman’s primary concerns was eliminating price level indeterminacy and volatility. He
felt that paying interest on reserves (and potentially combining it with a 100% reserve requirement)
would achieve these goals. As is obvious from Figures 5 - 7, paying interest on reserves in the pres-
ence of a constant per capita government deﬁcit at best maintains the level of price indeterminacy
and at worst increases the indeterminacy when compared to an economy where reserves do not earn
interest. In contrast, the impact on volatility, deﬁned as the variance over equilibrium outcomes,
may increase or decrease, depending on the number of steady state equilibria. The exact impact
on both will depend on whether the lower bound on the interest rate paid on bonds is binding in
equation (16).






´ ≤ z− (NI).
In this case, the lower bound on real money balances does not bind in either the no-interest
economy or the interest economy. Therefore, two steady state equilibria exist in both economies.
As Figure 5 illustrates, because there is nothing to tie down the initial level of real money balances
in either economies, there are an inﬁnite number of equilibrium paths which converge to the low real
money balances steady state, and thus, paying interest on reserves does not aﬀect the determinacy of
equilibria. In contrast, there will be less volatility in the case where interest is paid on reserves. The



















in the no-interest economy. Since
z+(I) <z +(NI), the range of real money balances is greater when interest is not paid — consistent
with Friedman’s ideas.
The intuition for this relates to two key issues. First, both economies are ﬁnancing the same
size after-tax deﬁcit. Second, the government’s ability to ﬁnance this deﬁcit is restricted in the
interest paying economy and unrestricted in the no-interest economy. In the no-interest economy
the government can use any mixture of bonds (a more expensive ﬁnancing option) and money (a less
expensive ﬁnancing option) to ﬁnance the deﬁcit. In addition, it is free to set any tax base and tax
rate for both of these ﬁnancing options, so long as suﬃcient revenue is raised to ﬁnance the deﬁcit.
In contrast, when interest is paid on reserves, the return on reserves is tied to bonds and therefore
money is a more expensive means for ﬁnancing the deﬁcit relative to the no-interest economy. This
also restricts the government’s ability to exercise a trade-oﬀ between a larger seigniorage tax base
and the seigniorage tax rate. Consequently the range of real money balances which can sustain the
per capita deﬁcit g, is smaller when interest is paid on reserves, i.e., z+(I) <z +(NI). Thus, in this
case interest payments have the desired eﬀect of reducing economic volatility.







´ ≤ z− (I).
In this case there exist two steady state equilibria in the interest bearing economy and only one
in the no-interest economy, as depicted in Figure 6. As a consequence, paying interest on reserves
increases both indeterminacy and volatility dramatically. The explanation parallels that of the
previous case just discussed. This result follows from the fact that in the no-interest economy,
the government is attempting to ﬁnance its deﬁcit with a mix of more (bonds) or less (money)
expensive ﬁnancing options. This can be achieved either by means of a large tax base and small
tax or vice versa. However, the government faces a lower bound on the return it can oﬀer on bonds
(due to the presence of the storage technology), while still ensuring that individuals hold both
money and bonds. This, in turn, results in a minimum level of the seigniorage tax base that must
be maintained so that the ﬁxed deﬁcit, g, can be ﬁnanced. However, in the no-interest economy,
the level of real balances at the low real money balances steady state is less than the minimum
22level needed to ensure that all assets are held, and consequently is not consistent with existence
of equilibrium. In addition, any dynamic paths which converge to this potential steady state are
also not consistent with equilibrium. Thus, there exists a unique equilibrium level of real money
balances in the no-interest economy.
This is not the case when interest is paid on reserves. The range of seigniorage tax base options
is limited by the fact that the return on the less expensive ﬁnancing option, money, is linked to the
return on the more expensive ﬁnancing option, bonds. Because the return on bonds and money are
linked, this reduces the government’s ability to choose the more or less expensive options to ﬁnance
their deﬁcit by limiting the trade-oﬀ between a large tax base and a large tax rate. Consequently, the
small money balances equilibrium represented by z− (NI) is not an option in the interest economy,
while z− (I)is suﬃciently large to be consistent with a binding reserve requirement and positive
money and bond holdings. Hence, there exists an inﬁnite number of equilibrium paths converging
to the low real money balances steady state and the range of real money holdings consistent with









. Thus, in this case paying interest on
reserves increases both indeterminacy and volatility.








In this case there exists a unique, high real money balance equilibrium in both the interest
bearing and no-interest economies, as depicted in Figure 7. Consequently, there is no indeterminacy
regardless of whether interest is paid on reserves. In addition, since equilibria consists on a singleton
in both economies, the level of volatility is also the same. Thus paying interest on reserves neither
helps nor hurts the economy in terms of reducing indeterminacy or volatility.
For Cases I — III, the level of indeterminacy and volatility depends on the number of steady
state equilibria which exists in the respective economies. After examining the above three cases,
one can conclude that either paying interest on reserves does not aﬀect the number of steady
state equilibria (and hence the level of indeterminacy is unaﬀected) or it increases the number of
steady state equilibria (and also the level of indeterminacy). The latter case, a rise in the level
23of indeterminacy, is the opposite of what Friedman had envisioned.22 With respect to the level
of volatility, when there exist multiple steady states in both economies, paying interest reduces
volatility, as Friedman had envisioned. In contrast, when interest payments increases the number
of steady states, it also increases the level of volatility.
As mentioned in the introduction, one key diﬀerence between Friedman’s ideas and this paper
is the source of any volatility. Friedman had envisioned volatility coming from stochastic aspects
of the economy. In this paper, any volatility or indeterminacy is a result of the tension which
arises between the government trying to ﬁnance a given deﬁcit while simultaneously trying to link
together the rates of returns on its ﬁnancing options.
4.3 Welfare
The ﬁnal point of comparison is the impact of paying interest on reserves on consumer welfare.
It is important to point out that the welfare analysis in this paper diﬀers fundamentally from
that found in both Smith (1991) and Freeman and Haslag (1996). In both of these previous
papers, governments did not have after-tax deﬁcits to ﬁnance, and consequently, neither did they
have government bonds which paid a lower rate of return to that of capital.23 Their analyses of
welfare were, therefore, examining Pareto optimal solutions. In contrast, the examination of welfare
conducted here is concerned with whether the transition to an interest paying regime is a Pareto
improvement. Given the fact that after-tax deﬁcits are ﬁnanced via money and bonds (both of which
pay a rate of return less than the storage technology), the solutions obtained in both economies are
“second best” solutions.24
Given Assumptions (A.1) and (A.2), which require that savings be a strictly increasing function
of the rate of return on savings, and the results of Lemma 4, it is straightforward to show that higher
real money balances are Pareto superior to lower real balances. Since the issue of concern is the
22This result is consistent with Sargent and Wallace (1985) and runs counter to Smith (1991). The diﬀerence
between Smith (1991) and this paper is two-fold. First, the real return to holding money balance in terms of date
t +1is not ﬁxed to the return on storage, and second, the government must ﬁnance a deﬁcit. If both of these
conditions did not exist, the results of this paper would be consistent with those of Smith (1991).
23Although Freeman and Haslag (1996) did not have government bonds, they did have government capital, which
can be thought of as negative quantities of bonds. However, in their model the return on “bonds” was the same as
the return to storage.
24Although I am not ascertaining what the Pareto optimal solution is, the analysis conducted is useful from a
purely “real world” policy perspective. In the case of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, for example, the option of
whether to pay interest on reserves or not is being considered within the context of real world deﬁcits which are
being ﬁnanced via instruments (bonds and seigniorage) whose rate of return is dominated by that of capital. Thus
the policy consideration is one of “second best options” and the welfare analysis conducted in this paper sheds light
on the likely impact of switching to an interest paying regime.
24impact on welfare when the economy transitions to an interest paying regime, the welfare analysis
is restricted to the case where there exist multiple steady state equilibria in both economies and the
economies are on dynamic paths converging to the low real balances steady state equilibria.25 This
case is depicted in Figure 5. A comparison of low real money balance steady state equilibria (and
the paths converging to them) yields zt (NI) <z t (I) at all dates t. For these equilibria, welfare in
the interest paying economy will be greater than when interest is not paid on reserves. In addition,
it is obvious that switching from a no-interest regime to an interest paying regime will result in
higher welfare. Thus, the transition will result in a Pareto improvement in welfare. However a
caveat must be noted. These results are derived from Lemma 4, which in turn requires that, ˆ z,
the real money balances associate with the real gross return on bonds being equal to one, must be
suﬃciently large. In addition, the equilibrium paths of real money balances must be less than ˆ z. If
these conditions are not satisﬁed, then only under a more stringent set of conditions will the above
results hold.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Although it is almost a half century since Milton Friedman ﬁrst made his proposal to pay interest
on reserves, the economic impact of this proposal is still not completely understood. Friedman
was motivated by his desire to eliminate costly price level indeterminacy and volatility, and thereby
improve overall economic well-being. Although several authors have examined the impact of paying
interest on reserves on these issues, their models omitted two important issues: paying a rate of
return on reserves equal to that of similar, short-term assets and accounting for how ﬁnancing a
government deﬁcit would alter the implications of switching to an interest-on-reserves regime.
This paper has attempted to re-examine those issues of concern to Friedman in the context
of a model where the rate of return on reserves equals that of government securities and where
the government ﬁnances an after-tax deﬁcit via debt and seigniorage. The model in this paper
breaks from the previous literature by using a standard three asset model (storage, bonds and
money), where the return to money is dominated by the return on other assets. Storage must be
intermediated and is subject to a reserve requirement, where the return on reserves is equated to
25A comparison of welfare at all equilibria when there exist multiple or a unique steady state equilibria could also
be undertaken. However, since the welfare analysis relies on the results of Lemma 4, this lemma would have to be
expanded to include cases where ˆ z was greater than (or less than) the high and low real money balances steady states
for both the interest and no-interest economies. This would require several subcases to be examined but would not
shed light on the transition from one regime to another since in many cases a switch to paying interest would result
in the non-existence of equilibria unless appropriate open market operation were simultaneously undertaken.
25the return on bonds. Finally, I also include scope for a government that must ﬁnance an after-tax
deﬁcit while simultaneously paying interest on bonds and reserves.
As a result of adding these two features, which were absent from previous models, I am able
to demonstrate results about indeterminacy, volatility, and welfare that diﬀer from the previous
literature. First, the level of indeterminacy is equal to or greater than the level when interest is not
paid on reserves. Second, when the level of indeterminacy is the same in the two economies, then
economic volatility is reduced with the introduction of interest payments. However, when greater
indeterminacy in the interest-on-reserves economy exists, then there also exists greater volatility.
Third, when the level of indeterminacy is the same in the two economies, then the equilibrium
associated with low real money balances (and the paths converging to it) in the interest economy is
welfare improving compared to the no-interest economy. Finally, under a narrow set of conditions,
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic may apply to some of the steady state equilibrium. Many of these
results run counter to what Friedman had envisioned and also to previous ﬁndings.
The key to these results is two-fold. First, by not pegging the return on reserves to the asset
with the highest real return, the model allows for multiple equilibria (unlike in Smith (1991) and
Freeman and Haslag (1996)). Multiple equilibria, and the possibility that the interest-on-reserves
economy has a greater number of equilibria than the no-interest economy, generate indeterminacy,
volatility, and welfare gains independent of the existence of sunspots, as in Smith (1991).
Second, the existence of an after-tax government deﬁc i tt h a tm u s tb eﬁnanced via a combination
of debt and seigniorage aﬀects how a shift from a no-interest to interest-on-reserves regime impacts
the overall economy. When the return on reserves is linked to the return on bonds, the options
available to the government in terms of how it ﬁnances its deﬁcit are limited. The government’s
ability to trade-oﬀ between higher cost funding (bonds) and lower cost funding (money) is dimin-
ished; as is the government’s ability to make a trade-oﬀ between a large seigniorage tax base and a
high seigniorage tax rate. Thus, paying interest on reserve reduces the set of real money balances
which can support a given deﬁcit while still making bonds and money an attractive investment
option to individuals. As a result, multiple equilibria are more likely to occur, which implies a
greater likelihood for indeterminacy and volatility when compared to the no-interest economy.
There is scope for extensions to this current work. Most obvious would be to analyze the
impact of paying interest on reserves in the presence of both risky assets and returns and an after-
tax government deﬁcit. This paper set out to analyze only one of the two omissions found in
the current literature: namely the lack of a government deﬁcit. However, equally important in
26Friedman’s original ideas was that the returns to reserves should be equated to like assets — i.e.,
ones with similar risk and return structures. Only when a model includes both of these issues
will we have a clearer understanding as to whether indeterminacy and volatility can be reduced by
means of paying interest on reserves.
276A p p e n d i x
AP r o o f o f L e m m a 1
a) That H (z,μ,φ,R)=0iﬀ z =0or z = z† follows immediately from the deﬁnition of H (z,μ,φ,d),
























i >S −1 (0).
However, Assumption (A.1).implies that S−1(0) < min{1,φR} holds and thus this equation is
satisﬁed.















































(1 − φ)S−1 (0)
> 0.

























< 0 <H 1 (0,μ,φ,R).
28B Proof of Lemma 2
From the deﬁnition of z†, the claim follows if
φR<
h



























The left-hand inequality in equation (b.1) follows from Assumption (A.4). The right-hand inequality
is implied by R>1.













































































If this equation holds, then H1 (z+,μ,φ,R) < 0 implies that H2 (z+,μ,φ,R) < 0 h o l d sa sw e l l .
However, equation (c.2) holds iﬀ
φR>[1 + φ(1 − R)]S−1.
For 1+φ(1 − R) < 0, this will obviously hold. In addition, if 1+φ(1 − R) > 0 and φR>1, then
by equation (16) this will also always hold. If neither of these is the case, then given Assumptions
29(A.1) and (A.2), a suﬃcient condition to guarantee the above is





It then follows from equation (20) that ∂z+ /∂μ < 0.
D Proof of Proposition 1





















































































∂μ has the same sign as H1. However, given
Assumption (A.2), if φR/[1+φ(1 − R)] >S −1 ¡
z†¢
holds, then φ(R − 1) − 1+φR/S−1 > 0













E Proof of Proposition 2





30However, this violates equation (16) and hence any z satisfying this condition cannot be part of an
equilibrium path.
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